The media and political pundits have had a field day over the classified memo that was leaked the other day. Their reasons are obvious; they hate that we are in Iraq. So they have clung on to that one sentence and, just like President Bush’s 16 little words, it will be proven in the end to be only half of the story.

Here is the sentence that has all of the anti-war nuts in a frenzy:

The Iraq conflict has become the “cause celebre” for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters forthe global jihadist movement.

That sentence alone could be damaging to our efforts to root out the terrorists throughout the world because in effect it states that by our own actions we are encouraging the behavior we are trying to stop.

But you have to remember the people that analyze this type of stuff don’t just stop at the simple answer they probe deeper…our reporters and Democrats stop when they see what they want.

The very next sentence…not the next paragraph but the next sentence states:

Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.

While I do not believe the President should declassify memos to prove the media right or wrong, I think that this was the right move. People need to understand that our fight with terrorism is not over until these people are more than demoralized; it ends when they are dead.

Here is more of the declassified memo that defends the “staying the course” strategy:

Al-Qa’ida, now merged with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

• The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa’ida.
• Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against
  Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global threat.
• The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa’ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.